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KENYA AND THE RULE OF LAW: THE
PERSPECTIVE OF TWO VOLUNTEERS
Kim Matthews and William H. Coogan*

I. INTRODUCTION
Reaction to Kenya’s 2007 national elections was explosive. Riots claimed at least
1000 lives, and upwards of 300,000 people were displaced from their homes.1 The
public lacked faith in both the ballot counting and in the impartiality of dispute
resolution by the judiciary. On both counts, public cynicism was justified.
No democracy can flourish without the rule of law. In the absence of faith in the
rule of law to replace police state oppression, government stability is evanescent. Rule
of law is a habit; it grows only through steady erosion of past practices and constant
reminders to officials that the times have changed. Public faith in the rule of law
cannot be demanded—it must be earned. Kenya emerged from dictatorial control in
2002. The process of gaining public faith in the rule of law is a long one, and Kenya
is in the middle of it.
II. THE ASSIGNMENT
We are a married couple who were in Kenya from September 2006 through
February 2007. At the time of the trip one of us, Kim Matthews, had been a lawyer for
nearly thirty years. She practiced in the area of family law and civil rights, while
serving as a community leader of civil rights groups and their political campaigns.
William Coogan had been a full time political scientist at the University of Southern
Maine. Also a lawyer, he occupied leadership positions in Maine civil rights organizations. The International Senior Lawyers Project (ISLP) asked us to go to Kenya to
enhance the capacity of a law firm that concentrates on human rights matters, and to
help the firm to develop the organizational operations of a think tank devoted to
constitutional research and the rule of law.
The law firm, Kamau Kuria and Kiraitu, consisted of one full-time and one parttime senior lawyer, two junior lawyers, a group of three to five pupils with rotating
membership,2 and a support staff of eight. Gibson Kamau Kuria was the full-time
senior lawyer. In his thirty-five year career he had represented scores of human rights
clients. When his work put him at odds with the dictatorship of Daniel arap Moi, he

* The authors wish to thank the International Senior Lawyers Project and especially Jean Berman,
Executive Director, for sponsoring their trip to Kenya. They also want to thank Gibson Kamau Kuria,
LL.B, B.C.L., LL.D. (Hon.) for hosting them in Kenya; Douglas Zolkind, ISLP Intern, for preparing
introductory material on the origin and development of constitutional law in Kenya; Sushetha Gopallawa
of the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights for her counsel; the staff of Kamau Kuria and
Kiraitu, Advocates; and especially Rose Kuria, without whom we would have been lost.
1. Jeffrey Gettleman, Death Toll in Kenya Exceeds 1,000, but Talks Reach Crucial Phase, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 6, 2008, at A8.
2. In Kenya, aspiring lawyers major in law as undergraduates, then serve a one year apprenticeship
as “pupils” before becoming eligible to take the bar exam.
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was accused of a capital crime grounded on trumped up charges, detained for nine
months, and subsequently exiled for two years. Now sixty years old, he continues to
work grueling hours on human rights cases and civic education initiatives. He sees
everyone who comes to his office—with or without an appointment.
With a view to institutionalizing his work, Kamau Kuria asked ISLP for two
volunteers, and we readily obliged. Our work would include training the younger
lawyers in the firm in strategy, case selection, legal research, brief writing, and trial
tactics. In addition, we would work with an affiliated organization, the International
Centre for Constitutional Research and Governance (ICCRG), a body created as an
educational resource on matters of constitutionalism, democracy, and the rule of law
for those in the legal, political, and public realms. We were to play a small role in
helping to foster the rule of law in Kenya, and met with both success and failures in
that task. The true import of these successes and failures can only be understood,
however, in the context of the legal and political landscape in which we were
operating.
III. THE SETTING: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL LANDSCAPE
Between 1885 and 2002, Kenya endured more than three quarters of a century of
British colonialism,3 followed by forty years of indigenous misrule.4 During that time,
there was enormous damage to governmental institutions and to the nation’s political
culture. Britain’s governance did not exhibit the same degree of relatively relaxed and
benign oversight that it manifested in its governance in other parts of the world.5
Colonization was late in Kenya, and the installment of British military and
administrative power was relatively efficient and quick. By appropriating the land in
Kenya, the British turned Africans—the overwhelming majority of the population—
into economic, social, and emotional paupers. By using the judiciary as an enforcement arm of administrative power, the “mother country” formed habits of corruption
and subservience to the executive. Through often one-sided judicial proceedings in
colonial courts,6 a massive extension of capital punishment for Mau Mau offenders,7
exploiting tribal rivalries,8 and incorporating torture9 and collective punishment10 as
tactics for dealing with the nationalist Mau Mau uprising of the mid-twentieth century,
Britain legitimized lawless brutality as the norm for dealing with the opposition.

3. See DAVID ANDERSON, HISTORIES OF THE HANGED: THE DIRTY WAR IN KENYA AND THE END OF
EMPIRE 387 (2005); CAROLINE ELKINS, IMPERIAL RECKONING: THE UNTOLD STORY OF BRITAIN’S GULAG
IN KENYA 5 (2005).
4. See MARTIN MEREDITH, THE FATE OF AFRICA: FROM THE HOPES OF FREEDOM TO THE HEART OF
DESPAIR: A HISTORY OF 50 YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE 79-87, 264-68, 383-85 (2005).
5. For example, in the British American colonies self-government, or its approximation, was
necessitated by the vast distances and primitive state of communication. LARRY BERMAN & BRUCE ALLEN
MURPHY, APPROACHING DEMOCRACY 29-30 (4th ed. 2003); CHRISTINE BARBOUR & GERALD C. WRIGHT,
KEEPING THE REPUBLIC: POWER AND CITIZENSHIP IN AMERICAN POLITICS 44-45 (2d brief ed. 2006).
6. See ELKINS, supra note 3, at 132.
7. ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 291.
8. See MEREDITH, supra note 4, at 151-61.
9. ELKINS, supra note 3, at 207.
10. ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 293.
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When the British left in 1963, they transferred the forms of democracy—
parliaments, courts, and administrative apparatus—to African Kenyans. They also
transferred a demoralized judiciary, a violent, oppressive, and corrupt police force, and
a contemptuous and venal bureaucracy.11 Local elites inherited these institutions, along
with national poverty. Because most of the elites could make a living only by clinging
to their public salaries and the attendant opportunities for graft, their major focus
became the retention of power. Thus, because the government inherited the
authoritarian tools for retaining power, Kenyans endured years of post-colonial
governmental predation, as those in power behaved like their British forbears: they
robbed, killed, and ruthlessly defended their positions.12
Kenya’s nationalist leader and first prime minister, Jomo Kenyatta, presided over
an authoritarian modification of the inherited government institutions.13 By
manipulating a pliant Parliament and using a constitution that could be amended by
that Parliament alone,14 he merged the offices of prime minister and governor general,
thereby converting Kenya into a presidential state. Next he pushed to eliminate
majimbo, a form of federalism, and created a centralized system.15 Eventually, he
eliminated the upper house of Parliament.16 Additional constitutional amendments
gave him the right to name twelve members of Parliament17 and to declare a state of
emergency without Parliamentary approval.18 As his suspicions about his opponents
grew, he used his consolidated powers to suppress the rights of free association,
assembly, and speech, and imprisoned several of his political rivals.19 In addition to
leaving Kenya an authoritarian government, Kenyatta used various forms of bribery
and intimidation to convert public lands to his own use and that of his political allies.20
Kenyatta died in 1978 and was succeeded by Vice President Daniel arap Moi.
Moi took a corrupt, authoritarian government and burnished it into a kleptocratic
dictatorship. In response to calls for increased political freedom, he bullied Parliament
into amending the constitution to institute one-partyism in Kenya.21 When calls for

11. See generally Makau Matua, Republic of Kenya Report of the Task Force on the Establishment
of a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, 10 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 15, 26 (2004) (“[T]he
post-colonial was autocratic at its inception because it inherited wholesale the laws, culture, and practices
of the colonial state.”).
12. See MEREDITH, supra note 4, at 162-78.
13. See generally Y.P. GHAI & J.P.W.B. MCAUSLAN, PUBLIC LAW AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN KENYA:
A STUDY OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF GOVERNMENT FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT (1970)
(providing a cogent history of constitutional and institutional change in the Kenyatta period); see also
Matua, supra note 11, at 26.
14. CONSTITUTION, § 47 (1998) (Kenya) (Alteration of the Constitution).
15. See COLIN LEYS, UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN KENYA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NEO-COLONIALISM
213 (1975).
16. Kenya High Commission in Canada, Kenya’s Brief Political History,
http://www.kenyahighcommission.ca/political_history.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2008).
17. CONSTITUTION, § 33 (1998) (Kenya).
18. Id. § 85.
19. MEREDITH, supra note 4, at 267.
20. KENYA NATIONAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, UNJUST ENRICHMENT: THE MAKING OF LAND
GRABBING MILLIONAIRES 7-8 (2006), available at http://www.knchr.org/dmdocuments/unjustenrichment
.pdf.
21. Matua, supra note 11, at 26-27.
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multi-partyism resurfaced, he fomented ethnic clashes in the Rift Valley and Western
Kenya that led to over 1500 deaths and the displacement of more than 300,000
people—all to demonstrate that multi-partyism was not feasible.22 Neither the judiciary nor the civil service enjoyed independent tenure under the Moi government. For
example, when opponents scheduled pro-democracy rallies, his appointees denied
licenses for the demonstrations.23 If the assemblies went ahead without administrative
consent, the police—often in concert with Youth-KANU, the thug division of the
ruling party—would intervene with unrestrained violence.24 Moi used the Preservation of Public Security Act25 to detain opponents without trial26 and instructed the
Attorney General to initiate charges of robbery with violence, a capital offense, against
human rights activists. Those charged would be locked up and tortured,27 then released
when the Attorney General filed a nolle prosequi motion.28
From underpaid public officials who supplemented their salaries with bribes (“to
make the pen move”), to police officers, whose offenses ranged from accepting a few
shillings for overlooking a traffic violation to engaging in murder-for-hire, corruption
became a way of life in Kenya. Many individuals and organizations have captured the
favor of officials—often through bribery—and have bought land from the state at fire
sale prices. The previous administration simply transferred ownership of Nairobi’s
signature skyscraper, the Kenyatta International Conference Centre, built with public
funds, to KANU, Moi’s political party.29 In August, 2006, the Nairobi City Council
sliced off a portion of City Park and gave it to a private developer.30 The example set
at the very top was breathtaking in its audacity. Officials close to Moi looted the
National Social Security Fund not once, but twice.31 A mix of public and private
officials defrauded the treasury of the equivalent of $600 million, in what became
known as the Goldenberg Scandal.32 When the first defendants were scheduled for
court appearances, the Attorney General filed another nolle prosequi.33
International support for the Moi dictatorship declined with the end of the Cold
War.34 Faced with increasingly intense and widespread domestic opposition, Moi
decided to retire, and his chosen successor, Uhuru Kenyatta, lost handily in the 2002

22. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DIVIDE AND RULE: STATE-SPONSORED ETHNIC VIOLENCE IN KENYA 1
(1993), available at http://hrw.org/reports/1993/kenya1193.pdf.
23. MEREDITH, supra note 4, at 401.
24. Makau Matua, Justice Under Siege: The Rule of Law and Judicial Subservience in Kenya, 23
HUM. RTS. Q. 96, 98 (2001).
25. The Preservation of Public Security Act, (1998) Cap. 57 (Kenya).
26. Matua, supra note 24, at 99-100.
27. MEREDITH, supra note 4, at 383-385, 400-04.
28. See CONSTITUTION, § 26(3)(C) (Kenya) (permitting the Attorney General to “discontinue at any
stage before judgment is delivered”).
29. Kamau Kuria and Kiraitu represented the post-Moi government in its successful effort to recover
the building.
30. Developer Back at City Park, DAILY NATION, Feb. 9, 2007, at 7.
31. MICHAEL JOHNSTON, SYNDROMES OF CORRUPTION: WEALTH, POWER, AND DEMOCRACY 172-73
(2005); see also JOHN MUKUM MBAKU, CORRUPTION IN AFRICA: CAUSES, CONSEQUENSES, AND CLEANUPS
316-19 (2007).
32. JOHNSTON, supra note 31, at 172; MEREDITH, supra note 4, at 385.
33. Matua, supra note 24, at 117.
34. MEREDITH, supra note 4, at 401-03.
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national election.35 The Rainbow Coalition, with Mwai Kibaki as its presidential
candidate, swept into power, promising not only an end to the dictatorship, but also the
enactment of a new constitution, election reform, and measures against corruption,
economic decline, and tribalism.36 Though the Kibaki Administration can be credited
with major achievements, including economic revitalization, increased tax revenues,
and a free primary education program, its proposed constitution was defeated, and
there have yet to be any convictions in the corruption cases.37
Democratic institutions remain wobbly in Kenya. The 2007 national elections
were marked by widespread ballot fraud, and the incumbent president was declared the
winner by his own handpicked Electoral Commission of Kenya.38 The opposition party
accused officials in the incumbent administration of political assassinations.39 Both
sides promoted clashes between party affiliated gangs and the police forces. The postelection agreement to share power by naming the losing presidential candidate to the
newly created office of Prime Minister40 is unlikely to end the accusations, and a return
to the detention practices of the Moi years may be on the horizon.
Tribalism provides the lens through which much of the Kenyan population views
political events.41 For example, during the 2005 constitutional referendum campaign,
opponents of the new constitution demonized the Kikuyus, the largest community in
Kenya, in order to promote a “No” vote, and as the 2007 elections approached,
politicians whipped up ethnic resentment for their own purposes.42 In November 2006,
thousands fled their homes in Nairobi’s Mathare slum as gang members killed one
another and politicians swept into the area to make appearances and allegations against
the government.43 In early 2007, land disputes in the Mt. Elgon area led to over forty
deaths, with militia leaders accusing cabinet ministers of “fanning the ethnic animosity
in the district.”44 The late 2007 presidential election was followed by some of the
worst ethnic violence in Kenya’s history.45
Kenya’s history of misrule has had a profoundly negative impact on cultural
aspects that have been identified as prerequisites for democracy: trust in others, trust
in the government, and confidence that citizens acting collectively can influence public
policy.46 In Kenya, there is a minimal sense of public ownership of governmental

35. JOHNSTON, supra note 31, at 171-72.
36. MBAKU, supra note 31, at 316-18.
37. Id. at 317.
38. See Jeffrey Gettleman, Disputed Vote Plunges Kenya Into Bloodshed, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2007,
at A1.
39. Jeffrey Gettleman, Second Lawmaker is Killed as Kenya’s Riots Intensify, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1,
2008, at A6.
40. Kenya: Agreement on Power Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, March 19, 2008, at A9.
41. See Jeffrey Gettleman, Kenya’s Kikuyus Are Being Routed From Lands of Rival Tribes, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 7, 2008, at A1.
42. Id.
43. See Michael Mugwang’a, Thousands Flee Their Homes as Slum Death Toll Goes Up, DAILY
NATION, Nov. 9, 2006, at 1.
44. More Die in Dispute over Settlement, DAILY NATION, Jan. 15, 2007, at 40.
45. Gettleman, supra note 1.
46. Political scientists have proffered data demonstrating the relationship between mass and elite values
and the viability of democratic political institutions. See generally EDWARD C. BANFIELD, THE MORAL
BASIS OF A BACKWARD SOCIETY (1958); ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION

2008]

KENYA AND THE RULE OF LAW

567

institutions, and little expectation that the state will provide services in an effective
manner. Moi’s corrupt and incompetent Attorney General remains in office. In
October 2006, he declined to prosecute corruption cases initiated by the Kenyan AntiCorruption Commission,47 and two months later, the official Performance Appraisal
of Government Ministries rated his office second from the bottom among thirty-four
ministries.48 Cynicism about politicians is rampant, and the public’s attitude toward
bureaucracy is one of avoidance when possible.
Lack of confidence in law enforcement, coupled with fear of police violence,
remain high.49 The newspapers report lynchings by citizens on a regular basis. In
November 2006, a police death squad removed three suspected gangsters from their
homes in Nairobi and shot them in full view of a large crowd.50 Indeed, evidence
points to a de facto policy of summarily executing suspected criminals.51 The Kenya
National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) accused the police of executing
some 454 men as part of an intensified crackdown on the Mungiki sect and other
wanted criminals.52 Most of the victims had been killed by a single gunshot wound to
the head.53
Politicians in Kenya profoundly mistrust one another. Much of the mistrust
derives from the sense that politicians put personal gain above political progress. For
example, a rapacious attitude toward the national treasury prevails among a large
segment of parliamentarians, who draw tax free salaries and perquisites appropriate for
wealthy nations in a region where the per capita annual income hovers around $500.54
Political parties function as vehicles for personal advancement, rather than as
organizations presenting competing policy visions to voters. The lack of party loyalty
is evidenced by the fact that between the 2002 and 2007 national elections, more than
74% of parliamentarians defected from their political parties in a process of jockeying
for personal advantage.55

(1971); RONALD INGLEHART, MODERNIZATION AND POSTMODERNIZATION: CULTURAL, ECONOMIC, AND
POLITICAL CHANGE IN 43 SOCIETIES (1997); ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND
REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000); OLIVER H. WOSHINSKY, EXPLAINING POLITICS: CULTURE,
INSTITUTIONS, AND POLITICIAL BEHAVIOR (2008).
47. See Attorney General Faults Graft Probe, EAST AFR. STANDARD, Oct. 19, 2006, at 1.
48. Performance Appraisal: Agriculture is Best Ministry, SATURDAY NATION, Dec. 9, 2006, at 5.
49. Joshua N. Auerbach, Police Accountability in Kenya, 3 AFR. HUM. RTS. L. J. 275, 277 (2003) (“A
majority of Kenyans indicate that, at best, they lack confidence in the impartiality and effectiveness of the
police, and that, at worst, they fear the police.”); see also Stephen Muiruri, Police Too Eager to Gun Down
Suspects, DAILY NATION, Jan. 22, 2007, at 3.
50. Michael Mugwang’a, Three Executed, Insist City Residents, SUNDAY NATION, Nov. 4, 2006, at 3;
see also Victor Bwire, Police Killing of Suspects is a Violation of Human Rights, DAILY NATION, Jan. 18,
2007, at 12.
51. See, e.g., Muiruri, supra note 49.
52. Cyrus Ombati, Police Accused of Executing Suspects, EAST AFR. STANDARD, Nov. 6, 2007, at 1.
53. Id.
54. Marc Lacey, Crisis Swirls in Kenya as Politicians Reward Themselves, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2006,
at A4. The base salary of parliamentarians is around $81,000 per year, tax free. In addition there are
allowances and perquisites that effectively double the amount. For example, parliamentarians get a car and
a mileage allowance of $4,719 for the first 350 kilometers they drive plus $1.60 per kilometer after that.
This is “particularly galling” to Kenyans whose per capita income in 2005 was around $463. Id.
55. Owino Opondo, New Bill to Tame Political Parties, SUNDAY NATION, Dec. 3, 2006, at 7.
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Moreover, authority for malicious interference with the election process is readily
available to the executive.56 One such avenue for manipulation by the executive is
through the Registrar of Societies, who serves at the President’s pleasure, and who has
discretion over which organizations (including political parties) to recognize and which
individuals within those organizations to recognize as office holders.57 As an extreme
example of executive interference in elections, the Registrar undercut the presidential
campaign of a prominent opposition politician by delisting him as party leader in late
2006.58 The executive has influence in other areas of the election process as well. In
early 2007, the President packed the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) with his
own appointees.59 The Commission schedules elections, registers voters, draws
constituency boundaries, and certifies results.60 In October 2007, the Commission set
the date for the general election at December 27,61 a time when most of Nairobi’s three
million citizens have departed for the countryside. After the election, early returns
reported in 189 of 210 constituencies showed President Kibaki losing his bid for
reelection by nearly one million votes.62 At that point, the ECK stopped counting the
votes.63 In perhaps the most astonishing example of malicious executive interference,
the ECK reconvened the next day and announced an incredible turnaround: Kibaki had
won by 231,728.64
In addition to the egregious executive manipulation of elections, the honesty,
competence, work ethic, and susceptibility of the judiciary to administrative influence
also remain problematic.65 In 2003, the Ministry of Justice dismissed twenty-three
judges for corruption.66 Those fired comprised nearly half the entire judiciary and
included not only several judges of the highest court, but many magistrates and other
court officers.67 Although the dismissals were an effort to root out corruption at the
judicial level, the deep entrenchment of executive corruption was again apparent when
in December 2006, two judges who ruled against Administration interests were
transferred from Meru to new posts 200 kilometers distant.
However, there have been other reform efforts in the judiciary, that although not
entirely successful, do show progress in the right direction. For example, there has
been an effort to streamline procedures of filing cases so that they are heard

56. See CONSTITUTION, § 41 (1998) (Kenya) (granting the President power to appoint all members of
the Electoral Commission of Kenya).
57. See The Societies Act (1998), Cap. 108 §§ 8-14; see also Opondo, supra note 55.
58. Lilian Muendo, Karua Dares ODM-K to Storm Statehouse, KENYA BROADCASTING CORP., Dec.
4, 2006, http://www.kbc.co.ke/story.asp?id=39743.
59. See Robert Shaw, ECK Appointments are Not Made in Good Faith, DAILY NATION, Jan. 18, 2007,
at 11.
60. CONSTITUTION, §§ 42, 42A, 43 (1998) (Kenya) (delineating the responsibilities of the Electoral
Commission).
61. See Warigia Bowman, Moving forward in Kenya, BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE, Jan. 6, 2008, at D9.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See generally Matua, supra note 24.
66. Wahome Thuku, Surgery in Judiciary That Never Was, DAILY NATION, Dec. 28, 2006, at 5.
67. Id. at 5, 7. Accusations of corruption are not new for the judiciary of Kenya. See MEREDITH, supra
note 4, at 385 (“‘Why hire a lawyer when you can buy a judge?’ ran a well-worn Kenyan saying.”).
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expediently.68 Furthermore, the new Constitutional Court (a division of the High
Court, Kenya’s court of general jurisdiction) has taken on controversial topics, and
some of the decisions have gone against the government.69 Although the implementation of the Constitutional Court is a positive change, most filings now include a
constitutional component which must be decided by that court before other aspects of
the case are tried, introducing a bottleneck into the case flow.70
There remain other impediments to speedy adjudication of cases that were
apparent during our time in Kenya. Judges’ work ethic is questionable; it is not
unusual for them to fail to appear in court. The judges have no research assistance.
There are no stenographers, no recording devices, and no computers in the courtrooms.
Nevertheless, the judges feel obliged to maintain a complete record of proceedings
before them in order to forestall reversals at a higher level, so they take down all
testimony and arguments on points of law in longhand—an agonizingly slow process
of dictation by lawyers and witnesses. Since mistrust among members of the legal
community is a given, the courts require lawyers to submit photocopies of the entire
opinion in every case cited in a brief.
The press is yet another facet of the problem. Despite the recent ranking by
Reporters Without Borders that put Kenya at seventy-eighth among 168 countries in
its World Press Freedom index (a respectable elevation from a rank of 118 in 2006),71
the press remains vulnerable. In May 2005, the First Lady invaded the offices of the
Daily Nation shortly after midnight to protest the coverage of a personal matter, and
subsequently slapped a cameraman filming the encounter.72 The Attorney General
dismissed assault charges against her.73 In early 2006, under the guise of a national
security investigation, a squad of masked police officers raided the facilities of the
Standard Group, owners of the Kenya Television Network (KTN) and the East African
Standard, Nairobi’s other major newspaper.74 The officers disrupted the television
signal, carried off computers, disabled the press, and burned thousands of newspapers.75 The Minister of National Security justified the attack, commenting, “When
you rattle a snake you must prepare yourself to be bitten.”76
Likewise, freedom of speech and assembly do not enjoy solid constitutional protection. In the run up to the 2007 elections, officials denied licenses for some political

68. Thuku, supra note 66, at 7.
69. Id.
70. Anecdotal evidence on this bottleneck includes one recent decision on child support that was
handed down by the court of first impression four years after the case was filed, and prosecutions in the
massive Goldenberg Scandal of the early 1990s that were finally “scheduled for scheduling” fourteen years
after the offenses.
71. Compare Press Release, Reporters Without Borders, Worldwide Press Freedom Index 2007 (Oct.
16, 2007), available at http://www.rsf.org/article/php3?id_article=24025, with Press Release, Reporters
Without Borders, Worldwide Press Freedom Index 2006 (Oct. 23, 2006), available at
http://www.rsf.org/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=639.
72. Xan Rice, Second Wife Slip Prompts Slap from First Lady, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 13, 2007,
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/dec/13/kenya.xanrice.
73. Id.
74. Marc Lacey, Kenyan Police Deliver Blows to the Press, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2006, at A8.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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marches and rallies.77 When the unlicensed events proceeded, they were broken up,
in some cases by party-affiliated youth gangs, in others by the police wielding
truncheons and firing tear gas or bullets—occasionally with fatal consequences.78
IV. THE TASKS
Against this difficult setting, we went to work. Matthews’s tasks included training
younger lawyers and supporting the human rights cases of the law firm’s chief lawyer
through legal research and brief writing. During her time at the firm, she faced a
number of impediments—some expected, some not. Resources that American lawyers
take for granted were often unavailable or unusable. Although the Kenyan legal
profession aspires to incorporate international legal innovations into their briefs and
decisions, the uneven availability of treatises and decisions by major courts of last
resort has frustrated this goal.79 Despite the availability of computers for word processing, access to the Internet remains troublesome. For example, shortly after we
arrived in Kenya, our office severed its relation with its Internet Service Provider (ISP)
and was reconnected after a nearly five month hiatus. Internet unavailability, resulting
from lack of ISP reliability and speed, exorbitant expense, and overall inertia, forced
us into Internet cafes.80
Despite these impediments, Matthews was able to train the staff to identify human
rights issues, perform legal research, recruit and select clients, organize moot court
events, and draft legislation. Reacting to an office whose shelves and walls were
stacked ceiling high with documents that only a full time librarian could locate, she
devised a system of case and office management that included maintenance of a card
catalog, a filing system to identify previous work product relevant to current cases, a
conflict identification system, and the organization of the pupil training program. She
instructed the staff on how to research cases decided by courts in East Africa, the
British Isles, South Africa, India, Canada, and the United States, along with the
European Court on Human Rights, and she identified international charters whose
provisions could be incorporated into Kenyan law when the latter was ambiguous.
In addition to her organizational and training efforts, Matthews helped prepare
briefs in several constitutional cases. To compound the technical, practical, and more
mundane obstacles that she faced within the law office, Matthews encountered a
judiciary plagued by corruption, improper influence, and partiality.81 One case

77. Graham Kiwa, Now No More Public and Political Rallies in Nairobi, KENYA BROADCASTING
CORP., Nov. 9, 2006, http://www.kbc.co.ke/story.asp?id=39360.
78. Id.; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BALLOTS TO BULLETS: ORGANIZED POLITICAL VIOLENCE
AND KENYA’S CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE 5 (2008), http://hrw.org/reports/2008/kenya0308/kenya0308web.
pdf.
79. The University of Nairobi’s Law Library’s holdings of United States Supreme Court decisions run
only to 1989.
80. The firm’s senior lawyer, a voracious consumer of legal information with a photographic memory,
felt no need for access to the Internet and was somewhat of a technophobe. It proved difficult to persuade
him that the younger lawyers required Internet access.
81. Though the Kibaki Administration promised “radical surgery” on the judiciary in Kenya as a means
of combating corruption, there has been skepticism as to the efficacy of such efforts. Thuku, supra note
66.
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involved a bishop of the Methodist Synod of Nkubu. He had been hired in 1974 but
was suspended in 2003 amid allegations of mishandling of church funds.82 The bishop
convinced a magistrate to issue an order directing the church to pay him half of his
monthy salary despite his suspension.83 Amid allegations of bribery on the bishop’s
part, the congregation appealed the decision to the High Court. Matthews argued that
the Kenyan Constitution gave a preferred position to the protection of individual
liberties, including the right of free association.84 Though this hierarchical conceptualization of constitutional rights proved absent from Kenyan jurisprudence, it
certainly has enjoyed such status elsewhere, and Matthews’s brief relied heavily on
such international precedents.85 The case proceeded slowly in the High Court—in part
because the High Court judge stayed proceedings after declaring that she, too, had
been approached with a bribe. In the aftermath of that accusation, the bishop asked the
judge to recuse herself, further delaying the court proceedings. As of this writing, the
congregation is still seeking to have the order set aside.86
Matthews also faced an executive branch that was at times brazen in its deprivation of individual rights. In one case, a Canadian mining company proposed an
investment of more than $160 million (U.S.) to extract titanium from a patch of land
in Eastern Kenya owned by over 300 farm families.87 The Kenyan government
regarded the proposal as an economic windfall and was anxious to get the project
moving. The government determined, ultra vires, to represent the farmers in their
negotiations with the mining company. Eight farmers objected; our office represented
them.88 Matthews submitted a constitutional brief focusing largely on freedom to
contract.
Although Kenyan cases generally move at glacial speed, the mining company case
proved to be an exception. Immediately after our office secured an injunction
prohibiting local officials and the Kenyan armed forces from intimidating farmers who
refused to sign sales agreements at the price negotiated by the government, the judge
scheduled a hearing on the company’s claim that the farmers had, in fact, agreed to a
price. He decided the case in the company’s favor, on basis of documents, including
three affidavits.89 There was no trial, and the judge heard no testimony from live

82. See Jibril Adan, Judge Accuses Church of Defying Court Order, EAST AFR. STANDARD, Oct. 5,
2007, available at http://www.eastandard.net/archives/index.php?mnu=details&id=1143975485&catid=
159.
83. Id.
84. CONSTITUTION, § 80 (1998) (Kenya) (“[N]o person shall be hindered in the enjoyment of his
freedom of assembly and accociation . . . .”).
85. See, e.g., Coetzee v. Government of the Republic of South Africa; Matiso & Others v. Commanding
Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison & Others 1995 (10) BCLR 1382 (CC) at 1403 (S. Afr.) (elevating the right
of personal freedom, as protected by the South African Constitution, to the status of fundamental right);
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (emphasizing the importance of the right to expressive
association).
86. Adan, supra note 82.
87. See Nyakundi Nyamboga, Twist in Battle for Land Compensation, EAST AFR. STANDARD, June 5,
2007, available at http://216.180.252.4/archives/index.php?mnu=details&id=1143969560&catid=4.
88. Patrick Mayoyo & Gitonga Marete, So Close, Yet So Far From Fortune, DAILY NATION, May 5,
2007, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200705070534.html.
89. Nzioka v. Attorney General & 8 Others, Petition No. 613/2006 (Dec. 19, 2006), available at
http://www.kenyalaw.org.
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witnesses. The proceedings from injunction to decision lasted three weeks. To add
insult to injury, the company later moved successfully to require the farmers to pay its
legal expenses.90 One can only speculate whether the judge was influenced by the high
priority the government placed on getting the mining project under way. Nevertheless,
the lightning speed with which the case moved, the disregard of documents showing
that the farmers rejected company offers, and the devastating decision on attorney’s
fees sent a message to those without substantial resources about the consequences of
impeding government policy.
While Matthews’s work brought her face to face with some of Kenya’s more
glaring problems in the judiciary, Coogan’s work with the International Centre for
Constitutional Research and Governance (ICCRG) presented obstacles and frustrations
of a different sort. ICCRG is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization founded in 2003
as an outgrowth of Gibson Kamau Kuria's human rights work. The organization’s
focus is on promoting democracy, constitutionalism, and the rule of law in Kenya and
elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa. Its activities have included research, publicity, and
the presentation of workshops. Volunteers affiliated with ICCRG have pursued
antigerrymandering lawsuits. ICCRG maintains holdings that, with the 2007
acquisition of the professional library of Richard Pierre Claude, founding editor of
Human Rights Quarterly, have become East Africa’s primary repository of human
rights literature.
Despite its ambitions and accomplishments, ICCRG was in dire straits when
Coogan arrived in Nairobi. In 2003, aided by the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center
for Human Rights, it had been awarded a three year grant from the National
Endowment for Democracy (NED). But ICCRG failed to hire competent staff and
neglected its obligation to file reports with NED. While ICCRG's board of directors
consisted of five members, only three attended directors’ meetings. Though they
reveled in discussions of legal and political theory, none wanted to supervise staff.
None had any fund raising experience and only one offered to learn how to do it.
Eventually, its grant was cancelled, its reputation damaged, and its office shuttered.
During his stay Coogan assisted the board in developing vision and mission statements,
a strategic plan, and grant applications. Despite these efforts, administrative malaise
proved too difficult to overcome. As of early 2008, ICCRG remains closed, and what
could be a forceful voice on behalf of human rights in Kenya is silent.
V. THE LONG VIEW
There are multiple obstacles to the promotion of human rights in Kenya. The
legacy of mistrust delegitimizes election outcomes. Violence occurs regularly during
political campaigns. Corruption is a fact of daily life.91 The practice of dunning losing

90. See Tom Mogusu, A Fresh Obstacle Faces Tiomin Mining Project, EAST AFR. STANDARD, Oct.
5, 2004, available at http://www.eastandard.net/archives/cl/print/news.php?articleid=2226.
91. Both Freedom House and Transparency International recently downgraded their evaluation of
Kenya, largely because of the failure of the Kibaki Administration to pursue allegations of corruption
against senior ministers. See Freedom House.org, Country Reports 2007, Kenya, http://www.freedomhouse
.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2007&country=7205 (last visted Mar. 31, 2008); TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2006, 188-91 (2006), available at http://www.
transparency.org/content/download/4822/28521/file/Part%202_8_countries%20A_K.pdf.
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parties for attorney fees is a massive disincentive to the assertion of constitutional
rights. Judges lack resources. Inertia keeps them from disposing of simple motions
over the telephone. The courts fail to penalize parties for late filings. Though judicial
review is constitutionally sanctioned,92 its practice is not yet smooth. Judges enjoy
constitutionally protected tenure during good behavior,93 but the possibility of being
removed by presidentially-appointed tribunals is real.94 Furthermore, the universal
human reluctance to learn new skills characterizes not only the judiciary, but law
offices as well.
Using volunteers burdens the receiving agency and interrupts its routine. Since
volunteers are temporary, there is no expectation that they will fully integrate into the
workforce. A volunteer may submit a paper then wait for several days with little to do
until the recipient has time to absorb it and react. The pace of the legal process in
Kenya is slow, and volunteers stare nervously at the advancing calendar, concerned
that the opportunity to make a positive impact is fleeting.
Kenya has made significant economic progress over the past five years, and
increasing national wealth—so long as its distribution is relatively widespread—
promotes democratic political development and a reduction in corruption. In addition,
civil society is vibrant, with all that that implies for the growth of social capital and the
diminution of mistrust. There has also been substantial growth in the number of
lawyers in Kenya. Forty years ago there were barely more than 300 lawyers in Kenya,
only twelve of whom were Africans.95 Today, there are over 5,000 attorneys, and in
the estimation of Gibson Kamau Kuria, the former president of the Law Society of
Kenya, over 90% are African.96 Though there is little tradition of pro bono service
among members of the bar, to the extent that lawyers are becoming an increasing
presence in public policy debates, there is a corresponding increase in the respect for
law, as well as a decrease in the prevalence of patron-client political assumptions
accompanying these debates. Although the Kenya Constitution provides for amendment by Parliamentary action alone,97 the Court of Appeals has limited the scope of
Parliament’s exclusive authority to routine matters, concluding that on major
constitutional issues, the public must give its assent in a referendum.98
Recognition for Kenya’s legal and political progress has been forthcoming.
Although consensus had built among international donors that investment in Kenya
was futile because of the high level of corruption, those donors have now begun to
reaccept applications from Kenyan institutions.99 As a result of increasing governmental scrutiny by the press, Reporters Without Borders has upgraded its assessment
of press freedom in Kenya100 and the shock of the raids on Nairobi’s leading media

92. CONSTITUTION, § 67 (1998) (Kenya).
93. Id. § 62.
94. See Thuku, supra note 66.
95. GHAI & MCAUSLAN, supra note 13, at 383 n.4.
96. The Law Society of Kenya, Membership Overview, http://www.lsk.or.ke/membership.php (last
visited Mar. 20, 2008).
97. CONSTITUTION, § 47 (1998) (Kenya).
98. Njoya & 6 Others v. Attorney General & 3 Others, (2004) 1 K.L.R. 261, 262.
99. Samuel Siringi, World Bank to Give Sh5.8bn for Education, DAILY NATION, Nov. 9, 2006, at 6.
100. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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outlets101 has receded into the past. Promoting the rule of law in an emerging
democracy is hard, frustrating work, and volunteers step in and out of what is often a
very long-term project. There are stops and starts, delays and failures. There are,
however, also accomplishments, such as helping to block a compromised judge’s
attempt to foist a criminal bishop on an unwilling congregation. Working within a
legal culture where lawyers make a practice of learning from other jurisdictions is
thrilling for Americans unfamiliar with that sort of outlook. Sensing that one is playing
a role in the promotion of democracy and the rule of law, no matter how attenuated,
is one of the highlights of a legal career.

101. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.

